THE TREND OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN
COOPERATIVE MARKETING*
FRANK EvANSI AND IRWIN CLAWSONI

The rising cost of living, together with the increase in the expense of operation
of farms, has focused the attention of the public on the need for greater economies
in the production and distribution of products of the soil. The conviction is growing that these economies may be realized through cooperatives. It has been demonstrated on a vast scale, over a period of nearly half a century, that the growing,
selling, and transportation processes by which food is supplied to the public are
more effectively handled through legalized combinations of producers than by any
other known means, and, as a very important part of this complicated process, the
exacting demands for both quantity and quality are realized.
Every arrival in the business arena bringing with it a new idea has been compelled to justify its existence not only in practice but also under the scrutiny of the
courts. Not all have survived, but the cooperative corporation has made constant
progress and now is so firmly established that it has come to be regarded as a
permanent part of the American economic system.
That type of litigation designed to test the validity of the cooperative is steadily
decreasing, and rarely do we find, in these days, a judicial challenge to the foundation upon which these institutions are built. Occasionally, a case is found concerning some activity other than agriculture where cooperative principles are involved and by which some additional light may be reflected upon the agricultural
cooperative. A good example is the Associated Press case.' No doubt the public,
as well as the bar, was surprised to find that this institution, wholly different in
character from the agricultural cooperative, was treated by the Court as a cooperative organized and operating on the same principles as the agricultural cooperative. As was to be expected, the case aroused widespread interest. The government
sought and obtained a conviction for violation of the Sherman Act. The association
was classified as non-profit, and operated on a membership basis. Its by-laws set
forth its plan of operation so far as new members were concerned, and in relation
to that plan the Court said:
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Undisputed evidence did show... that its By-Laws had tied the hands of all of its
numerous publishers, to the extent that they could not and did not sell any part of
their news so that it could reach any of their non-member competitors. In this respect
the [trial] Court did find, and that finding cannot possibly be challenged, that AP's ByLaws had hindered and restrained the sale of interstate news to non-members who
competed with members 2
On the question of special exemption of cooperatives under the Sherman Act, the
Court added: "It is significant that when Congress has desired to permit co-operatives to interfere with the competitive system of business, it has done so expressly
5
4
by legislation," 8 citing the Capper-Volstead Act and the Clayton Act.
The majority opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Black. A vigorous dissent
was voiced by Mr. Justice Roberts, who charged that the majority was making a
public utility out of the Associated Press, while Mr. Justice Murphy contended that
the restrictions were permissible because the members were merely trying to preserve an advantage gained by business sagacity.
It is generally believed that the issue as to exemption of agricultural cooperatives
from the antitrust laws was definitely settled more than two decades ago. The
Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion in the Liberty Warehouse case0 made the
following statement:
It is stated without contradiction that co-operative marketing statutes substantially
like the one under review have been enacted by forty-two states. Congress has recognized
the utility of co-operative associations among farmers in the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730;
the Capper-Volstead Act, 42 STAT. 388; and the Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926, 44
STAT. 802. These statutes reveal widespread legislative approval of the plan for protecting
scattered producers and advancing the public interest. Although frequently challenged,
we do not find that any court has condemned an essential feature of the plan
with the
single exception of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the above cited case. 7
To the same effect were the decisions of other courts."
Recently, however, the issue has again come into the forefront,0 and no doubt
it will continue to be raised because of the very nature of the subject matter involved. For the public conscience has always been especially sensitive to restraints
of trade when the particular commodities sought to be controlled have been the
necessities of life. That the means of securing control were legitimate has never
been enough; it was the end in itself that was condemned. Thus in very early times
aid. at 13.
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the English courts nullified patents of the Crown and invalidated contracts in
restraint of trade.
The point here to be emphasized, however, is that the operations of the modern
cooperative corporation, even though it does restrain trade, and though it deals with
the necessities of life, are not attended by any of the forbidden practices referred to
in the early cases, where the parties were actuated primarily by the profit motive.
The structure and the purposes of the agricultural cooperative are such that to be
guided by the profit motive would be self-destructive-destructive of the institution
itself. The cooperative's only guaranty of success is faithful service to those who
buy and consume its products. Mere profit-making, which is the motivation of
the organizations condemned for restraints of trade, is not and cannot be a motive
in the true cooperative association. This was recognized as early as 1926, when
the Supreme Court of North Carolina10 made this observation:
The co-operative marketing system was forced into existence to guarantee fair prices
to the producers, a fair wage for labor and to prevent extortion upon the consumer....
There is no analogy between the proceedings to dissolve the great trusts which have
benefited by this system, as in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases and others,
and these associations for the protection of the producers. 1
The desirability, however, of free competition in trade is only relative, and depends upon existing economic conditions. 1 2 The early English laws on monopoly

were the forerunners of the American doctrine, and were, of course, designed to
meet local conditions existing at the time of their adoption. The identical doctrines
have been preserved, but in their application to the larger and more complex
problems of the present day, under constantly changing economic conditions, they
have been found inadequate.
We do encounter relics of these ancient common-law offenses in our state constitutions and statutes, although the last of the English laws was repealed in i844.la
Minnesota's constitution, for example, provides that any combination designed to
monopolize the markets for food products or to interfere with or restrict the freedom of such markets is a criminal conspiracy.' 4 The meaning of this provision
as defined by the Minnesota Supreme Court 15 in sustaining the constitutionality
of the cooperative marketing law is of interest. The court said:
This provision of the Constitution is restrictive only.
The law is purely one of expediency, and to better the economic condition of the producers.... It aids and harmonizes with the-constitutional provision, which is aimed
"Tobacco
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1 Id. at 179.
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at those who hoard and speculate in food products, and who interfere arbitrarily and artificially with the natural flow of commerce in such products. 16
A similar provision of the Utah constitution provides that any combination
having for its object or effect the controlling of the price of any products of
the soil is declared to be against public policy and is prohibited.17 This important
measure, adopted fifty years ago, was passed by the constitutional convention
after a heated debate in which practices generally approved today were condemned.
The Idaho and Montana constitutions have similar provisions with reference
to products of the soil.'
Other state constitutions provide against trusts and
monopolies without special reference to food supplies or products of the soil,' 9
while the statutes of a number of states make special reference to agricultural
products.2 0
In interpreting such provisions, in the earlier cases the courts construed them
as opposing cooperative marketing organizations; in the later cases, as favoring
them. But it must be borne in mind that when the earlier cases were decided
there were few, if any, cooperative marketing statutes declaring, as such statutes
21
I
do, a newly developed public policy.
This definite but gradual change is most significant and far-reaching in its effects, both economically and judicially. In its early stages, progress was slow but
none the less persistent, and at every step it has met with resistance. Though
the United States is now generally committed to the new doctrine through the
declarations of legislatures and judicial decisions, there are those who periodically raise the old issues or exercise their ingenuity to suggest new ones. An excellent example of this opposition is found in the attitude of one of the concurring
judges in a Washington case22 who, though compelled to recognize the modern
trend, qualified his assent by saying that he was not in accord with the repeated
decisions of that court sustaining the cooperative contract, but that, since this had
become the established law, the "appellants put their necks within the halter, and
there is no escape." 28
Another illustration, and one which is quite typical of these periodic efforts at
resistance, is the present campaign on the question of taxation. It may readily be
conceded that there are points of unquestionable merit in these elaborate programs
of attack against the cooperatives, but generally, as time will surely demonstrate,
the programs are faulty, inaccurate, and-in many respects misleading and deceptive.
T
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The present status of the controversy is so far from final settlement that it would
be futile to attempt to crystallize out of the present confusion any conclusions showing the trend on this subject. It might be well to suggest at this point that the
defense should take the same form as heretofore. There should be a strict adherence to facts. Let the case of the cooperative rest upon its own merits and avoid
resort to the common practice of denouncing the opposition. If the assailants
succeed in pointing out any weaknesses or errors in structure or operation, these
should be corrected.
Retrospectively, a few illustrative early cases, followed by the more recent expressions of courts and legislatures, will bring into focus the well marked, step-bystep development of the law by which the present-day cooperative is authorized
and governed. In an Illinois case 2 4 in 1895, a cooperative milk association sought
to recover for milk sold and delivered to the defendants pursuant to an agreement.
The statute prohibited any combination to regulate or fix the price of any commodity, and provided that no person transacting business with such a combination
should be liable for the price of any commodity purchased from it. According to
the by-laws of the association, some of its objects and purposes were to secure to
the producer a just return for his product and to the consumer a pure and wholesome quality. The association did periodically, but not arbitrarily, establish the
price at which milk was to-be sold. The court decided that the association came
within the terms of the state antitrust statute, and held it to be a combination in
restraint of trade, denying a recovery under the contract of purchase.
In the case of In re Grice in 1897,25 a federal court, in construing a statute which
prohibited all combinations in restraint of competition and exempted from its provisions "agricultural products or livestock while in the hands of the producer,"
said: "This statute under discussion is clearly class legislation... 26
Students of cooperative marketing law are familiar with the Connolly case,22
which was invariably cited as an authoxity opposed to exempting agricultural producers as a class from the operation of the antitrust laws. In this case, decided five
years after the Grice case, the Supreme Court, in construing an Illinois statute almost
identical with the law involved in the Grice case, exempting "agricultural products
or livestock while in the hands of the producer," used this language:
•

..

if combinations of capital, skill or acts ...

are hurtful to the public interests and

should be suppressed, it is impossible to perceive why like combinations in respect of
agricultural products and livestock are not also hurtful.28
At the time this decision was written, all combinations in restraint of trade
were regarded as inimical to the public interest. Because of the abstract principle
set forth in the language quoted, the Connolly case became a controlling decision.
"Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Ass'n, 46 Ill. App. 576, 39 N. E. 651 (895).
2"In re Grice, 79 Fed. 627 (N.D. Texas 1897).

"1 Id. at 646.

' Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902).

"Id. at 563-564.
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The Decorah case" is of great interest to the farmer cooperator. Three hundred,
and fifty farmers at Decorah, Iowa, engaged in raising hogs, decided to enter into
a cooperative arrangement for the marketing of their product. They organized a
society and for two years engaged in cooperative selling, marketing 25,000 hogs
and distributing $43oooo among their members. Their purpose was not to pile
up a surplus and pay dividends, but "to establish a market where the farmers would
receive for their hogs what they were worth in Decorah." At this point a hog
buyer for the Chicago market brought suit against the association, complaining
that this group of farmers, by their combined action, were making it necessary for
him to pay more for hogs in that locality than he had paid before, and he urged
those familiar doctrines of the law-restraint of trade, monopoly, and stifling of
competition. The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld a permanent injunction against
this little group of producers. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Deemer,
said the "plaintiff was placed at a disadvantage and could not compete with the
society in purchasing hogs from its members, and the members were not free to
deal with plaintiff. If they dealt with him, he either forfeited his profits, by reason
of having to pay too much for his hogs, or they forfeited a part of the purchase
price as a penalty for selling to another." "To our minds," said the court, "this
was undue restraint of competition."3 0 This was recognized as a leading case in
the application of the old doctrine to producers' cooperative associations, 3' but the
doctrine as here applied has, under cooperative marketing statutes, been wholly
overturned." It should not be overlooked that this association was organized under
the general law. It is also worthy of note that in an earlier case, Judge Deemer,
construing the antitrust statute, held that laborers might fix the price or value of
their services.38
The first well-considered case announcing the doctrines to which the courts in
recent decisions are committed was the Gillaspy case,3 4 decided by the Supreme
Court of Indiana just one year prior to the decision in the Decorah case. At that
time there was a sharp conflict between the two doctrines, with the weight of authority favoring the theory of the Decorah case, and there was great uncertainty
whether that of the Indiana court could survive. The Gillaspy case, however, is clear
and well reasoned, and stands today as one of the best considered cases of this
category.
Up to that time the struggle had been largely a legal one, and the real nature
m

" Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Co-op. Society, x6o Iowa 194, 14o N. W. 844 (1913).
'0ld. at 848.
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and genius of the farmers' cooperative movement was little understood. So we
are led to inquire into the basis of the subsequent trend. Is it legal, or economic,
or both? It is sufficient to say that basically the problem is economic, but the
solution is legal, usually leading into the question of monopoly and restraints.
Although our courts followed the English decisions in determining the question
of monopoly, the American people were not satisfied with limitations merely as to
time and place. Americans resent bigness and its consequent influence and interference with free competition. Thus the decisions in this country deal with the
broader doctrine that all contracts tending unreasonably to restrict competition, by
whatever means, are contrary to public policy.
The first important application of this doctrine in this country was in the Standard Oil case, s5 in which Chief Justice White traced the development of the principles of monopoly and restraint of trade in English law and found the basis for
the so-called "rule of reason." The distinction between restraint of trade, the
English doctrine, and restraint of competition, the later American development,
must be considered if the recent decisions of American courts are to be appreciated.3 8
No doubt the principles of the common law as applied to the circumstances in
England which gave rise to them were well justified; but when an attempt was
made to apply them to conditions vastly more complicated, operating over a great
territory and applying to an economic situation which is almost wholly different,
it is not surprising that these doctrines have in a measure failed to accomplish their
purpose. In the Standard Oil and Tobacco Company 7 cases, size and consequent
influence were undoubtedly regarded as objectionable. But in the Steel Trust 8
cases the Court held that the antitrust laws offered no objection to the mere size of
a corporation, even though its strength might give to it a dominating place in the
industry, and that it was entitled to maintain its size and the power that legitimately goes with it, provided no law had been transgressed in obtaining it. The
principles enunciated in these cases were later reflected in the Mason case, 9 in
which the Tennessee court said:
The mere fact that complainant [cooperative marketing association] is large and powerful, and may in the future be guilty of some one or more of these acts [coercion or suppression of competitors, arbitrarily fixing and maintaining prices, or other acts making
combinations illegal], does not render it an unlawful combination or trust. 40
The significance of size and its possible effect has been before the Supreme
Court recently in the new American Tobacco case, 41 which somewhat modifies
the views expressed in the earlier cases. The prosecution there was directed against
the so-called "Big Three"--American Tobacco, Liggett & Myers, and Reynolds
"Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,

221

U. S. 1

(1911).

"'Cf. Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac.
""United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. so6 (1911).

144 (1913).

United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 447 (1920).
"Dark
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Mason, 15o Tenn. 228, 263 S. W. 6o
0
' 1d. at 65.
"American Tobacco Co., et d. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
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Tobacco. Together, according to the records, they manufactured 68 per cent of all
cigarettes in i939. Concerning this matter of size, the Court said:
Without adverse criticism of it, comparative size on this great scale inevitably increased
the power of these three to dominate all phases of their industry. "Size carries with it
an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have
been utilized in the past." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. io6.
We agree with the lower courts that such actual exclusion of competitors is not necessary to that crime [violation of the Sherman Act]. 42
Quoting with approval from the Aluminum case, 48 the Court continued:
[Defendant] insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened and
to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization,
having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel 4
In 1921 the Supreme Court decided the American Column & Lumber case,"
in which the legality of the so-called "Open Competition Plan," sometimes known
as the "New Competition," was considered for the first time by the Court. The
declared purpose of the association was to disseminate among members accurate
knowledge of production and marketing conditions so that each member might
gauge his market intelligently instead of guessing at it; to make competition open
and above-board, instead of secret and concealed; and to substitute frank and free
statements of competitors for the frequently misleading and colored statements of
the buyer. The plan as operated was condemned by the Court, but in a dissenting
opinion, significant because of the later attitude of the Court, Mr. Justice Holmes
said:
I should have thought that the ideal of commerce was an intelligent interchange made
with full knowledge of the facts as a basis for a forecast of the future on both sides. A
combination to get and distribute such knowledge, notwithstanding its tendency to equalize, not necessarily to raise, prices, is very far from a combination in unreasonable restraint of trade....
I must add that the decree as it stands seems to me surprising in a country of free
speech that affects to regard education and knowledge as desirable. 40
Just four years after Mr. Justice Holmes expressed these views, in 1925, the Supreme Court decided the Maple Flooring47 and the Cement Association cases, 48
in which a majority of the Court approved in principle the doctrines set forth by
Mr. Justice Holmes in the American Column case. These cases certainly show
a relaxation of the purpose to prevent a common understanding and a common
"2M. at 796, 8og.
"United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
"Id. at 431. See also State ex rel. Arm. v. Consumers Co-op. Ass'n, x63 Kan. 324, x83 P. 2d
423 (1947).

"American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (192X).
"'Id.
at 412, 413.
'T Maple Flooring Manufacturing Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (x925).
"Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925).
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enterprise, and the contention is not without merit that these decisions constitute
a virtual recognition of the fact that the ancient English common-law rules of
monopoly and restraint of trade which we, through our antitrust statutes, sought
to perpetuate, and which the English courts had so widely extended,4 9 are not
applicable to present-day economic conditions in America.
In 1933 a long stride was taken in the gradual development of the doctrines of
restraint. In the Appalachian Coals case 5" the Court was presented with the problem of a sick industry attempting to help itself. The number of persons employed
in the mining and distribution of the product was large, and the need for the product was great. Yet, because of overproduction, aggravated by "distress" coal continuously thrown on the market, coupled with the existing economic depression,
the situation had become desperate. Some 137 producers, who controlled 73 per
cent of the coal produced in the Appalachian region, established a common sales
agency, the accused in this case. The lower court found that in the operation of
the combination there was a diminished production (but sufficient for all needs),
and referred to the previous surplus as a "wasteful surplus." The lower court also
found that the sellers "will not have monopoly control of any market nor the power
to fix monopoly prices." Chief Justice Hughes, delivering the opinion of the Court,
said:
The mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate competition between themselves is not enough to condemn it.... A cooperative enterprise otherwise free from
objection, which carries with it no monopolistic menace, is not to be condemned as an
undue restraint merely because it may effect a change in market conditions, where the
change would be in mitigation of recognized evils, and would not impair, but rather
foster, fair competitive opportunities. Voluntary action to rescue and preserve these
opportunities and thus to aid in relieving a depressed industry and in reviving commerce
by placing competition upon a sounder basis, may be more efficacious than an attempt
to provide remedies through legal processes.... The fact that the correction of abuses may
tend to stabilize a business, or to produce fairer price levels, does not mean that the
abuses should go uncorrected or that cooperative endeavor to correct them necessarily
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. 5 1
Here we have an expression of the most advanced thought of the time on the
long disputed question of reasonable restraints through combination in the interest
of efficiency-the lines followed by American farmers through almost half a century.
President Theodore Roosevelt, 52 aware of the impending agricultural crisis,
struck a prophetic chord when he said to the Country Life Commission in ig91:
If there is one lesson taught by history, it is that the permanent greatness of any state
must ultimately depend more upon the character of its country population than upon
anything else. The problems of farm life have received very little consideration and the
result has been bad for those who dwell in the open country, and, therefore, bad for the
" Cf. Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. [1894] A. C. 535.
"°Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 ('933).
6Id. at 353, 360, 373-374.
"Communication to the Country Life Commission, July io, 91o.
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whole nation.... I am well aware that the working farmers themselves will in the last
resort have to solve this problem for themselves. 53
This Commission in its report to the President recommended:
There must be a vast enlargement of voluntary organized effort among farmers themselves. It is indispensable that farmers shall work together for their common interests
and for national welfare. If they do not do this, no governmental activity, no legislation, not even better schools, will greatly avail.54
The farmers, through societies such as the American Farm Bureau Federation,
the Grange, and the Farmers' Union, became the advocates of their own cause, and
they placed it before the country with such earnestness and conviction that almost
all interests were converted. One of the direct results of this campaign of education was reflected in numerous decisions in which the courts took judicial notice
of the agricultural emergency"5 and upon that basis sustained cooperative marketing
laws, affirmed membership contracts, and approved the operations of the cooperative marketing associations.
Public opinion having been thus established, it immediately began to crystallize
into statutory form. In the national enactments, the change was evident in the Clayton Act,5 6 passed in 1914, which provided that the antitrust laws should not "be
construed to forbid the existence or operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations." In 1922 the Capper-Volstead Act 5 7 was passed, providing
that "farmers . ..may act together in associations .. .in . . .marketing . ..

products." There were also acts passed by almost every state in the union which
recognized cooperatives and legalized their organization and activities.
It is well to observe the effect of changing public opinion on the application of
the antitrust law to farm cooperatives. Concerning this the Alabama court,55 in
upholding a contract with a cooperative marketing association, aptly said:
As a matter of fact, while some of the fundamentals of public policy will probably remain unchanged through all the ages, public policy is generally affected by the changing
values of expediency; and hence a public policy which in one age prescribes (sic] certain
conduct as injurious to the public welfare, may in a later age, under changed economic
and social conditions, wisely and justly tolerate, if not encourage as beneficial, the
identical conduct.59
A New York court,5 0 in upholding against a charge of restraint of trade a
contract between a milk distributor and a dairy cooperative, binding the distributor
52 ibid.
"'Report of the Commission on Country Life, SEN. Doc. No. 705, 6oth Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (.19o9).

" Cf. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Ass'n, 208 Ky. 643, 271 S. W. 695 (x925); Harrell
v. Cane Growers' Ass'n, x6o Ga. 30, 126 S. E. 531 (1925); Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v.
Dunn, x5o Tenn. 614, 266 S. W. 308 (192o); Warren v. Alabama Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n, 213
Ala. 61, 104 So. 264 (x925).
as38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. S (1940).
7
ST 42 STAT. 388 (r922), 7 U.S.C. S291 (1940).
"Warren. v. Alabama Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n, 213 Ala. 6x, 104 So. 264 (1925).
59Id. at 267.
"Barns v.'Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass', 22o App. Div. 624, 222 N.Y.S. 294 (1927).
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to buy milk only from the cooperative and thus allegedly depriving the plaintiff of
his former outlet for milk, said:
The Legislature, backed by public opinion, has determined that the state can afford to
give special treatment to this dass of producers. It is a question, not of technical
constitutional law, but of social policy. 61
The Supreme Court of Kentucky,62 in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning a contract which, it was charged, violated the antitrust laws because 75
per cent of the growers in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Indiana were subject to it,
upheld the contract and said:
That all law, even constitutional law, is not static, but progressive and in step always
with sound economic conditions and an enlightened public policy, recently has come
to be realized dearly, if ever it may have been thought otherwise, as is attested by the
highest judicial and lay utterances.6 3
The Indiana court, which in the Gillaspy case6 4 in 1912 pioneered the trend
toward upholding marketing cooperatives against the charge of restraint of trade,
fourteen years later reaffirmed its stand " and said:
The rule of reason must be applied in determining whether a contract is in restraint
. "There must be an unreasonable or
undue restraint of trade ... [such] as is detrimental to the public interest."'66
of trade and whether it creates a monopoly. .

And the court continued that it "would be turning the wheels of progress backward to hold such contract in restraint of trade .. "67 when the purpose was to
promote orderly marketing in the interest of the producers and the public.
Finally, after many courts had distinguished their cases from the Connolly
case,68 the Supreme Court in 194o overruled that terror of the cooperative lawyer.
during the early decades of this century, saying:
Connolly's case has been worn away by the erosion of time, and we are of the opinion

that it is no longer controlling.6 9

It would certainly appear that cooperatives have passed from the least favored
position to a place of equality in most respects with other marketing agencies in
the sight of the law. In one recent case, 70 a court has taken a position well in
advance of that which might have been expected when the struggle for equality
first began. There a cooperative dairy was indicted for violation of the Sherman
Act. The court held that the cooperative was, by the Clayton Act, granted immunity from the operation of the antitrust law. After reviewing the trend of de"Id.

at 305.
,Poiter v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (923).
"Id. at 35.
",Burley Tobacco Society v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. 583, IOO N. E. 89 (1912).
Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op. Ass'n v. Rogers, 88 Ind. 469, 15o N. E. 384 (1926).
Id. at 387.

"Ibid.
"Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902).
"OTigner
v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940).
*0United States v. Dairy Co-op. Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. C. Ore. 1943).
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cisions on the labor clause in the Clayton Act and the apparent reluctance of "antilabor" courts, as described by this judge, to accord to labor the exemption granted
by the Clayton Act, and drawing the conclusion that this attitude of the courts
resulted in the Norris-LaGuardia and the Wagner Acts, the court said:
I am asked to hold that under certain circumstances, even when acting solely in its selfinterest and not in concert with others, a farmer's cooperative can be punished as a
monopoly....
It may be that the acts of the defendant co-operative in this case, tested without regard to the provisions of the Clayton Act, are monopolistic in character. I have not
given serious thought to that question for it seems to me that when Congress said cooperatives were not to be punished, even though they became monopolistic, it would be
as il-considered for me to hold to the contrary as were some of the early labor
decisions .... 71

One recently decided case 72 further emphasizing this continuing trend favorable to cooperatives may well be questioned, however. There a third party sued
the cooperative for a personal injury. It was held that the company was not liable
in tort because it was a non-profit organization and hence, reasoned the court,
quasi-public. No other case, so far as we know, has appeared which follows this
reasoning. That is not surprising, for it will be conceded that there is a vital dffference between a cooperative and a charitable or quasi-public corporation such as
a hospital or a taxing district.
The Kentucky court, in 1935 in the Hy-Grade Dairiescase,73 involving a similar
question of law, did hold the cooperative liable in tort. In the course of the tugof-war for the milk, the court declared the cooperative dairy liable for stopping a
competitor's truck and removing all milk therefrom when only part came from
members under contract to deliver milk to the association.
Antitrust laws have been passed generally by the states and by the national government.74 The effect of such legislation has been limited, however, particularly in
state courts, because it has been repeatedly held that these statutes were mere reenactments of common-law principles and did not have the effect of enlarging the doc7 The exemption of labor and agricultural organizations
trines of the common lawY
contained in the Clayton Act has been thought of dubious value78 and up to the
present time the provisions of the Capper-Volstead Act,7 7 passed in x922, legalizing
farmers' cooperative associations for the transaction of interstate and foreign busiibid.

"Arkansas Valley Co-op. Rural Electric Co. v. Elkins, 2oo Ark. 883, 141 S.W. 2d 538 (1940).
"Hy-Grade Dairies v. Falls City Milk Producers Ass'n, 261 Ky. 25, 86 S. W. 2d 1046 (5935).
"See Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (I890), as amended, x5 U.S.C. 41 (r940); Clayton Act, 38 STAT.
730 (914), 15 U.S.C. 512 (1940); Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAr. 7,7 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. 541 (1940).
"Cf. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. x, 51 (19xi); Cumberland
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 100 Miss. 102, 54 So. 670 (191).
" Cf. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459 (1917); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U. S. 443 (1921). But c. the Dairy Co-op. case, supra note 70.
V 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C.
291 (1940).
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ness, have not been refined by judicial construction except in the Borden case 78
and perhaps in the Elm Spring case.79
In the Borden case, further indications of the restrictions applicable to cooperatives under the restraint-of-trade rule are found. There a cooperative dairy and a
number of distributors and labor unions united to control the price of milk in
Chicago. The decision revolved largely around the Capper-Volstead Act rather
than the Clayton Act. The district court made an order of dismissal, relying upon
the Agricultural Marketing Act8 and upon the premise that the Capper-Volstead
Act legalizes price-fixing and to that extent modifies the Sherman Act. But the
Supreme Court refused to permit so broad an exemption, and said:
The right of these agricultural producers thus to unite in preparing for market and
in marketing their products and to make the contracts which are necessary for that
collaboration, cannot be deemed to authorize any combination or conspiracy
with other
81
persons in restraint of trade that these producers may see fit to devise.
The Court observed that the conspiracy charge was not directed against the
formation of an association of producers to market their respective crops, but rather
against a conspiracy with a majority of the distributors and labor unions to maintain artificial prices, and that such a combination finds no justification in the Capper-Volstead Act. The Court further held that the cease-and-desist orders of the
Capper-Volstead Act are not a substitute for criminal proceedings under the Sherman Act.
A possible inference from the Borden case would be that any act of the farmer
cooperative to control prices would be tolerated if the cooperative did not conspire
with other groups to effect its purpose. This would accord with the first and, so far
as has come to our attention, the only decision in a prosecution by the Federal
Government against a cooperative on the charge of enhancing prices, where the cooperative was not combining or conspiring with other groups but was acting
alone.8 2 As pointed out above, this was a district court decision only and immunity
was granted under the Clayton Act rather than the Capper-Volstead Act.
In the Elm Spring case the reference to the Capper-Volstead Act was dictum,
but the federal district court observed that the purpose of the Act was to give cooperatives exemption from the effect of the Sherman Act.83
A field to which cooperatives might look for light on the interpretation of the
Capper-Volstead Act is that created by a fishermen's law8 4 passed in 1934. The
two statutes are identical except that one refers to farmers and the other to fishermen, and the cease-and-desist orders are issuable by different cabinet officers. Two
" United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188 (x939).
"United States v. Elm Spring Farm, 38 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 194z).
s0
1 5o STAT. 248 (1937), 7 U. S. C. §671 (1940).
' United States v. Borden Co., supra note 78, at 204-205.
s2 United States v. Dairy Co-op. Ass'n, supra note 7o.
SSUnited States v. Elm Spring Farm, supra note 79, at 511.
ad 48 STAT. 1213, 1214 (1934),

15 U.S.C.

§§521, 522 (1940).
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cases 5 have been decided under this Act, both of which reflect an attempt by
fishermen to "corner" their respective markets. In both cases the court held the
action to be illegal.
There are new trends developing where membership is recognized as the right
of an individual and not a privilege conferred by the association. This was hinted
at in the Associated Press case. But the decisions on this aspect are found in labor
cases rather than in those involving cooperative marketing associations. While there
are some recent cases 6 holding that a closed shop is not compatible with a union
which refuses equal membership to all, there is another late decision 87 where the
contrary doctrine was applied. The issue of monopoly of the labor field was the
basis of the decisions which held that membership is a right and not a privilege.
A late case which attracted widespread attention because of the nature of the
attack and because of the great size and extended operations of the association is
that of the Consumers Co-operative Association, s8 usually referred to as the C.C.A.
The attorney general of Kansas (the domiciliary state) brought quo warranto
proceedings against the cooperative seeking its dissolution. This corporation is a
supply cooperative engaged in domestic and foreign trade on a large scale. It
shipped overseas three million gallons of motor oil. It had exchange agreements
with all the major and independent oil companies, owned and operated 45o oil
wells, four oil refineries, canning plants, lumber mills, soybean plants, paint factories,
and printing plants. The court rejected the contention that the association had exceeded its authority, denied the petition for dissolution,, and held that the ownership
and operation of oil wells, refineries, pipe lines and other properties was merely
incidental to the "manufacturing and furnishing of farm supplies" as authorized
by the statute. While the dominant issue in this was whether the corporate activities were ultra vires, the question of the right of C.C.A. to admit non-resident
corporations as members was raised. The court approved this practice in the face
of what appeared to be a contrary restriction in the statute.
At first view, it is difficult to recognize this vast and varied operation as a
farmers' cooperative, but the mere fact that it is not typical of such organizations
does not necessarily mean that these operations are beyond its legitimate authority
so long as it is serving the interests of those for whom it is authorized by statute
to act. It would, therefore, be difficult to reach any conclusion other than that
arrived at by the court. It is the nature and not the extent of the operations which
is the test of validity.
In view of the developments to the present time, it may be said that the day
of decisions such as those in the Decorah, the Grice, and the Connolly cases is
"Hinton v. Columbia River Packers' Ass'n, z~x F. 2d 88 (C.C.A. 9th 1942); Manaka v. Monterey
Sardine Industries, 41 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
"James

459,

169

v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 72!, X55 P. 2d 329 (1944);

Betts v. Easley, x61 Kan.

P. 2d 83X (1946); Williams v. International Brotherhood, 27 Cal. 2d

586, x65

(1946).
" Clark v. Qris, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 55 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1947).
"State ex rd. Am v. Consumers Co-op. Ass'n, 163 Kan. 324, 183 P. 3d 423 (1947).
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past. Necessary controls exerted by cooperatives on the movement of farm products to prevent gluts and shortages, with their attendant fluctuations in prices,
are uniformly approved. To accomplish this purpose, these organizations are expressly exempted from the provisions of the Sherman Act, and there is now no
reluctance on the part of the courts in recognizing and upholding the exemption.
It is clearly evident that the farmers' cooperatives have made a distinct advance
toward a position of equality with other businesses in our national economy.
In the process of cooperation, competition will still be found; not mere personal competition-the type of competition that depends upon cunning in disposing
of the product-but rather competition in the quality of the product. Salesmanship
is secondary. The selling effort has been put into quality production and begins
on the farm. Cooperation involves pooling and commingling, and the inferior
product is automatically penalized, creating the strongest incentive for excellence.
The observation is frequently made by our courts and others that our economic
system is based upon competition; that "Competition is the Life of Trade." Our
economic system under this better form of business rivalry may yet be based upon
cooperation, and the time may come when our familiar commercial maxim will
take the form, "Cooperation is the Life of Trade."

